Antonio has it right–and this isn’t just Hobbes. It’s basically every conception of government and civil society in the history of the world stacked against your reasoning.

It’s fairly simple, really. I have no problem saying Tiller deserved to die–but the right to kill has been confined to a specially defined office. We do this with all sorts of things. Cops can pull people over and write traffic tickets. I can’t (even if I really, really think somebody’s driving badly). The President can order soldiers into combat. I can’t (even if I really, really think they might help). And so on. When we violate these rules, civilization collapses–we get pure chaos (and a LOT of violence). So this is the difference between actual law and mere personal judgments of right and wrong.

For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely), if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men.

There are exceptions, such as killing in self-defense. Although, in my opinion, an individual who does so lawfully is effectively acting as an agent of the state.

The point is that individuals don’t get to unilaterally make the rules about when the use of lethal force is permissable.

Why is this even an issue?

The parallel is Roeder-Military and Tiller-Hussein

I think not.

All you’re doing is making a distinction that indicates no real difference.

One might expect that any serious disciple of Jesus might find a way to value humility. And is it not the case that Biblically observent Christians folk ought to be concerned for procedural justice in a world in which God has given the state the right to bear the “sword.” I do understand that a commitment to unconditional pacifism makes this second consideration seem like a dodge, but for those of us who cannot share the pacifist vision as a matter of conscience, it advances neither understanding nor Christian faithfulness to make the false accusation that these matters all turn on mere pragmatism.

“The answer, I think, has to do with prudence. We live in a society and a culture in which there is wide disagreement about the moral personhood of the unborn child (or, if you prefer, “fetus”). Taking another human life is the gravest crime imaginable. If one is prepared to do that, one had better believe that one has no other choice, and that the stakes are radically high. The consequences for introducing lawless violence into a society, even in a righteous cause, are unpredictable, and stands to bring about a worse evil than the evil the violence is designed to fight.”

Since I read Dreher’s prudence argument a little differently, found it hard to dismiss out of hand. To me, it’s not simply a matter of expediency, such as avoiding bad publicity. If so, that would be a weak argument indeed. Rather, Dreher is saying that, as often happens in real life, the choice is between two evils. Of the two, he believes sanctioning the murder of the abortionist on moral grounds is risky because it leads to the possibilityt that others may find it easier to act as judge, jury and executioner. If that happens, where does it stop?