Recent discussions have probed how one can, in an ethically consistent manner, condemn the murder of George Tiller, while simultaneously insisting that, as an abortionist, he was a mass murderer who had vowed to kill again. In all of these discussions, as well as the broader discussion all over the web, the answer always seems to come back to the issue of the necessity of legitimate authority to exact justice. In other words, Tiller should have been convicted, put on death row, and given a lethal injection, not gunned down by a vigilante. Okay, that has a certain prima facie plausibility to it, but lets look deeper here.
It seems to me that the only way the argument from state legitimacy can gain purchase is if we operate on the basis of an understanding of abortion that pro-lifers cannot accept, at least on the basis of common pro-life rhetoric. The argument from state legitimacy posits that abortion, which is understood and described as legally-protected genocide, does not call the legitimacy of the state into question. But if mass genocide doesn’t nullify the legitimacy of the state, then what would count? If our government were systematically rounding up all Latinos and gassing them, would we really be arguing that its wrong for citizens to violently oppose the government because, you know, after all they’re the government? If government-protected genocide does not mitigate the legitimacy of the state, its hard to see what ever could.
In other words, pro-lifers constantly call abortion murder and genocide, but when it comes to actually dealing with it, they treat it like a social ill that is undesirable, but best handled through due process and proper channels. In short, it doesn’t really look like they think is genocide.
But if abortion on demand really is the genocide we often say it is, this leaves many pro-lifers in the odd position of, in essence, arguing that it is completely impossible for the state to ever forfeit its legitimacy. Is that really what we want to be arguing? I certainly do not. Again, it seems to me that the only consistent way to condemn the murder of abortionists, as a pro-lifer, is to embrace some ethic of nonviolence. Only if violence itself is to be rejected as a tool of any and all social change and political action can we consistently stand against acts like this.
Pro-lifers need to acknowledge (as a foundational principle of the movement) the Scriptural teaching that God establishes governments and requires that we work obediently (non-violently) within the confines of his established civil authorities as an act of obedience to Him. Ghandi and MLK Jr demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach for influencing and changing government in the modern media age.
Or, to put the question another way:
If pro-life patriots support the right of a people to violently overthrow a government because of excessive taxes and a lack of parliamentary representation, how much more should they support the violent overthrow of a government due to legally sanctioned genocide?
I think Tolstoy’s concept of “public opinion” addresses this situation very well: the (vast?) majority of Americans embrace a heritage of violent revolution, but very few would support such violence today. That is because the public opinion has changed. Moreover, the majority in the US is in favor of abortion, so the political (and hypothetical violent) actions of pro-lifers have a very small chance at success while the status quo of public opinion remains. I hate to sound like President Bush, but: “hearts and minds.”
Halden,
Isn’t there a way to deny the ultimate legitimacy of the State while still acknowledging a certain provisional legitimacy to its just actions? What exactly is the power of the sword? How can Paul in the same breath, so to speak, tell us 1) that vengeance is God’s alone and 2) that we should be grateful for the civil (pre-final judgment) punishment of evil?
I suppose I’m willing to grant that most, if not every, civil institution exercises its power illegitimately, in the sense that it exists during a new dispensation of grace and non-violence. But is this ultimate “illegitimacy” a reason to disregard the temporary role of civil authority? Paul grants even Neronic Rome some sort of ad hoc grounds for authority.
Is it possible that the “practical” pacifist must exercise even more patience than the “true” pacifist? The latter can completely disown and disregard the exercise of civil or personal violence. The former doesn’t have it quite so easy. When Nero uses tax revenue to burn Christians, we — unlike Yoder — keep paying the full tax (Rom 13:6).
I’m still somewhat in flux concerning all this, so I’m glad you’re raising the question, particularly in the midst of a very real, difficult situation.
I think I agree with you, Davey. My assault here on “legitimacy” is not in the service of telling everyone to disregard government, rather it is to point out that legitimacy cannot play the role that so many theologians are deploying it for in regard to the Tiller incident.
The whole Romans 13 thing would be a massive discussion it itself. But the main point I’m pushing in regard to the discussion right now is that appeals to legitimate authority don’t really work in mitigating the moral question of violence in defense of the innocent.
Granted. And yes, this opens up a discussion that’s entirely too expansive.
I think we both agree on the ultimate inadequacy of violence. If the US did execute Tiller, that wouldn’t set all things to right. If that’s the extent of your application, I have no disagreement. But it seems to me that you’re taking this one step more. You seem to be suggesting that because the US gov’t has itself used its violent power for evil, we should not simultaneously look to it to actually punish evildoers like Tiller. Correct me if I’m mis-reading you.
If that’s true, my question remains: if Paul could consider Nero’s authority as legitimate enough to punish evildoers (which is a far cry from “setting things right”), then how can we not hope for the US gov’t to do the same?
I do think we can hope for that. But, based on the logic that this is not merely a juridical matter, but a matter of immediate violence being propagated against innocents, the question is left open, if the state refuses to protect the innocent, are we to simply stand by?
In other words, the issue, at least from Roeder’s point of view is that murder is happening, and seemingly the only way for him to stop it is to use violence. Much as if there were a person just haphazardly shooting people in a crowd. One would not think that this is a juridical matter that can only be touched by the state. One would think that innocents are being murdered and all people of good will bear an obligation to stop this action, by the use of violence if necessary.
Why is it that it’s always one person who must do what needs to be done? What if, instead of a lone vigilante, 50 or 100 or 1000 pro-lifers simply surrounded an abortion clinic and were willing to be arrested, over and over again? Why is it that there is no real call from any church authority for united, non-violent action to stop abortion? Isn’t a few months in jail and a criminal record worth the life of a child?
If abortion was declared illegal in the US today, abortions would still be performed in the US tomorrow. Would a pro-lifer be justified in killing those who were performing the abortions tomorrow? Or, would the pro-lifer be required to use the state to stop the abortions instead of resorting to personal action?
Why do you only present two options – murdering abortionists or leaving the matter in the hands of the state? Two figures you admired earlier, Gandhi and MLK, rejected both options. They disobeyed the state but were very active and remained non-violent, and as you rightly pointed out, they accomplished much of what they set out to do.
I was focusing on the Roeder case. Those approving his actions seem to do so on the basis that the government was not protecting the life of zygotes and fetuses, reasoning that that freed him to do so on his own by killing the abortion doctor. What would be the argument if abortions were suddenly illegal, since that would not stop abortions, just drive them underground again? Would an individual who killed an abortion doctor in a nation where abortion was illegal still be considered justified in doing so?
“Again, it seems to me that the only consistent way to condemn the murder of abortionists, as a pro-lifer, is to embrace some ethic of nonviolence. Only if violence itself is to be rejected as a tool of any and all social change and political action can we consistently stand against acts like this.”
I heartily approve of this thought. Now If I could just reconcile my own tensions with regards to these questions.
How about Joseph in Matthew 2 as a model of nonviolence in the face of the murder of innocents. It’s obedience (Joseph) vs. will to power (Herod).