Category Archives: Rowan Williams - Page 2

The Church’s Claim

“The Church claims to show the human world as such what is possible for it in relation to God–not through the adding of ecclesiastical activities to others, and not through the sacralizing of existing communal forms, but by witnessing to the possibility of a common life sustained by God’s creative breaking of existing frontiers and showing that creative authority in the pattern of relation already described, the building up of Christ-like persons. The Church’s good news is that human community is possible; the Church’s challenge is its insistence that this possibility is realized only in that giving away of power in order to nurture authority in others that is learned in the giving away of God in Jesus, and its further insistence that the relations constituting Christ’s Body neither compete with nor vindicate others, but simply stand on their own right as the context which relativizes all others.”

– Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 233.

Being Converted in a World of False Communality

“The transfiguring of the world in Christ can seem partial or marginal if we have not learned, by speaking and hearing parables, a willingness to lose the identities and perceptions we make for ourselves: all good stories change us if we hear them attentively; the most serious stories change us radically. that is why tragedy is important, especially in a culture of false communality. And if we can accept  a very general definition of parable as narrative both dealing with and requiring ‘conversion’, radical loss and radical novelty, it may not be too far-fetched to say that the task of theology is the explication of parable, and so of conversion.”

– Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 42.

If we Speak for God, then Everything is Permitted

Žižek takes Dostoyevsky’s dictum “If God doessn’t exist, then everything is permitted” to task, claming, in true Žižek fashion, that the opposite is in fact true: if God does exist everything is permitted to those who speak for God:

“[Dostoyevsky] couldn’t have been more wrong: the lesson of today’s terrorism is that if there is a God, then everything, even blowing up hundreds of innocent bystanders, is permitted to those who claim to act directly on behalf of God, as the instruments of his will, since clearly a direct link to God justifies our violation of any ‘merely human’ constraints and considerations. The ‘godless’ Stalinist communists are the ultimate proof of it: everything was permitted to them since the perceived themselves as direct instruments of their divinity, the Historical Necessity of Progress towards Communism.” (Violence, 136)

Žižek makes a very good point, but one that needs two responses. The first response comes (at least to me) through Herbert McCabe. The only god we could ever “act directly on behalf of” is precisely that, “a god,” an inhabitant of the universe, a “top person” who legitimated our activities. The God of the Christian confession is not a top-person, a mere existent whom we could claim to represent directly. Rather God is the reason there is anything at all, the source of all being, and as such lies beyond our ability to directly mediate or claim. McCabe notes that most atheists think of the question of God as though religious people “claim to have discovered what the answer is, that there is some grand architect of the universe who designed it, just like Basil Spence only bigger and less visible, that there is a Top Person in the universe who issues arbitrary decrees for the rest of the persons and enforces them because he is the most powerful being around. Now if denying this claim makes you an atheist, then I and Thomas Aquinas and a whole Christian tradition are atheist too” (God Matters, 7). Only if God is some sort of existent, a “top person” who issues arbitrary decrees could we conceptualize God as the justification for acts of violence. And this is not the God of the Christian faith.

Secondly, a response via Rowan Williams, whose new book on Dostoevsky sheds quite a bit of light on the fragment the Žižek seeks to invert. Williams notes that

“[Dostoevsky] is not really interested in arguing the question–in general terms–of whether God exists. This does not mean that the reality of God is a matter of indifference to him or that he can be claimed from some for of contemporary nonrealism. But the different between the self-aware believer, the self-aware sinner and the conscious and deliberate atheist is not a disagreement over whether or not to add on item to the total sum of really existing things. It is a conflict about policies and possibilities for a human life: between someone who accepts the dependence of everything on divine gratuity and attempts to respond with some image of that gratuity, someone who accepts this dependence but fails to act appropriately in response, and someone who denies the dependence and is consequently faced with the unanswerable question of why any one policy for living is preferable to another.” (Dostoevsky: Language, Faith, and Fiction, 227)

Further to this point, Rowan Williams’ theology offers a helpful response to Žižek’s critique in that for Williams it is completely impossible for the church to ever make a strict identification between their work and the will of God. The only possible “direct link” we have to the Christian God is the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ which forbids us from gingerly locating ourselves on the side of God and God’s cause. Rather, according to the Christian gospel we are addressed by God precisely as those whose agenda is at cross-purposes with God. Any attempt on the part of the people called by God to equate their will and action with that of God is always to exchange the true God for some miserable godlet, an idol. Moreover, the God whose power is manifest precisely as cross and resurrection does not allow those who would follow God recourse to any other mode of power:

“God’s power ‘tells us who we are’ only in the risk and reciprocity of God’s life with us in Christ, as God displays his identity in the terms of human freedom and human vulnerability. That is the power by which the whole world is given newness of life, humanity itself is given new definition. And because it is that kind of power, refusing to functionalize and enslave what it works with, the process of preaching a transfiguring gospel must take place in a community that resists the idea that one human group can ever have license to define another in terms of its own needs or goals or fantasies. All must be free to find that ultimate self-definition in the encounter with a God who does not use us as tools for his gratification but shares a world of risk and contingency with us to bring us to our fullest liberty in relation with him and each other.” (On Christian Theology, 288-89)

Precisely because our only “direct link” to God is that of the cross and resurrection, Christians can never assume any posture of power than that displayed by God with us. As such, just as God enters into our lives on the path of cruciform vulnerability, so Christians are forbidden to deal with others, including religious others from any standpoint that would instrumentalize them in terms of our own needs, agendas, or fantasies. The cross forbids us any optic that would allow us to see other persons as obstacles to be overcome or destroyed for the sake of our own ends. Rather we are called to kenotically allow the other to be the other, trusting their transformation to the God of the resurrection. Christians, far from having their ambitions legitimated, are called to rest in the contingency and risk of not securing what they perceive the proper place of the other. For the acts of violence and domination that Žižek analyzes are ultimately reducible to a perverse attempt to narrate the other in a particular way, to circumscribe the other as a particular sort of other whose place must be determined by my ideology.

As such, I submit that only the Word of God in Christ, which calls us to this life of kenotic defferal-in-trust is able to actualize events of true peace in this world. For it establishes that we do not speak for God, God speaks for God in Christ. The proper mode of Christian action is always first silence before that speech which calls us out of our delusions and fantasies and into a life of vulnerability and contingency. Only such a mode of living, participating in the kenosis of Christ can be a true event of peace in a world of violences.

An Anarchic Mercy

To believe in Jesus’ God, the God of unconditional accessibility and even-handed compassion, to believe in an anarchic mercy that ignores order, rank and merit, is to accept that our projects and patterns are the mark of failure, of illusion, of the infantile belief that we can dictate truth and reality. Because it is menacing and painful to be confronted with the knowledge that our constructions of controlled sense are liable to be empty self-serving, we readily turn to violence against the bearers of such knowledge: in Johannine terms, we have decided that we want to stay blind when the light is there before us, claiming we can see perfectly well.”

– Rowan Williams, The Wound of Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Cowley Publications, 1990), 17.

Baptism, Eucharist, and Unity

“If we believe that unity is given by God in baptism, and that any other starting point compromises the unique place of divine initiative, some other questions rearrange themselves.  Baptism itself makes no sense except in the contexts of a robust trinitarian theology — it is the gift of a charismatic identity in Christ, the possibility of entering into Christ’s prayer, which is, Scripture tells us, the flowering of an eternal relation within the eternal source, and is enabled in us only be the inbreathing of God.  In other words, baptism already encodes the theology elaborated by the doctrinal disputes of the early Church.  And the sacrament of the eucharist as a the regular renewal of this charismatic identity is again primarily a witness to the divine invitation into the place where Christ stands, into Crist’s relation with the Father, opened to us by the paschal event, by his cross and resurrection.  A very great deal can be said about the essence of the Church simply in reference to what is understood about baptism and eucharist; to grasp these human actions as necessarily and centrally witnesses to what human beings cannot do, as gifts of new identity and relation, is to see why it is possible to define the unity of the Church first in relation to this pattern of corporate activity.”

–Rowan Williams, Why Study the Past? (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2005), 83.

The Unassimilatability of the Risen One

“There is at Easter no Christ who simply seals our righteousness and innocence, no guarantor of our status, and so no ideological cross.  Jesus is alive, he is there to be encountered again, and so his personal identity remains; which means that his cross is his, not ours, part of the history of a person who obstinately stands over against us and will not be painlessly assimilated into our own memories.”

–Rowan Williams, Resurrection: Interpreting the Easter Gospel (Cleveland, Oh: Pilgrim Press, 2002), 71-72.

Rowan Williams on the Creed and Truth

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DQ_GveH4ly0]

H/T: Thinking Out Faith

Resurrection and Peace

“What the gospel of the resurrection has to say about peace, then, seems to me to be most clearly audible if we grasp that the resurrection promise has something to do with the roots of our mistrust and violence in our unwillingness or inability to receive our human identity from God as a gift, at every juncture in our experience.  This means being able to leave behind the fantasy of a decisively successful performance as a human being, or a human society: building into my projects and hopes a proportionality that acknowledges the possibility of defeat and thus the possibility of repentance.  It means leaving behind no less the fantasy of life in untrammelled immediacy of experience and expression, or life in transparent companionship with those like myself: building into my sense of myself the unavoidability of conflict, the lack of resolution in any effort to transform the human world, the reality of moral and spiritual error, limitation, exhaustion.”

–Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 273.

Rowan Williams on Dostoevsky

I just found out that Rowan Williams has a new book coming out later this year dealing with the works of Fyodor Dostoevsky entitled Dostoevsky: Language, Faith, and FictionThis promises to be yet another great work from the Archbishop’s pen.  We should all be thankful for such an amazing theologian to occupy the chair in Canterbury.  It is truly sad that the various newspaper scandals of the ECUSA and their rejection of authentic union, communion, and obedience continue to define how people regard the Archbishop.  I continue to be thankful for his life, service, and scholarship.

Sacrifice, Gift-Giving, and Philanthropy

The works of Kathryn Tanner offer a great deal to the contemporary theological community.  Her theology is deeply centered in the development of two key concepts: a theology of divine transcendence and the principle of noncompetitiveness.  Her development of these themes was portrayed most clearly in her Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology and such insights were later applied directly to economics in her more recent Economy of Grace.  Both of these works make substantial contributions in their own right and as such have real value.  However, there are some debilitating weaknesses in Tanner’s account of a theological economics which flow from her construal of the shape of noncompetitive gift-giving.

Against accounts of giving and economics that assume a principle of competitiveness and strife, Tanner argues in light of the revelation of the trinitarian God as a fount of pure self-giving love, that Christians must reject such an economics of scarcity and competition.  So far, so Augustinian.  However, when she goes about explicating the shape of such an economics of noncompetitive gift-giving, problems begin to sprout up all over the place.  Tanner argues that “the Persons of the Trinity give to one another without suffering loss; each continues to have what it gives to the others.”  Thus, for her it follows that “we too, then, should give to others out of our own fullness.”  What Tanner cannot embrace is any notion that our giving to others might come at a cost to ourselves.  Rather, “we do not give out of our poverty, but of what we have already received so as to work for the good of others in response to their need.”  We give out of our abundance, never out of lack.  Indeed, “giving to others…should not mean impoverishing ourselves.  Giving away should not be at odds with one’s continuing to have” (Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 93-94).  

For Tanner, the shape of the life of total giving to which the Christian is called by the triune God is not a life of sacrifice, but a life of non-needy fullness in which giving away need not cost or diminish us in any way.  Rather than calling us to self-denial, the gospel of God’s gift-giving calls us to see that “self-assertion, the effort to realize ones own perfection and good, therefore need not be at odds with concern for the needs of others.”  This orientation leads Tanner to argue for the formation of a “community of mutual fulfillment in which each effort to perfect oneself enriches others’ efforts at self-perfection.” (Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 94).  She is emphatic on these points, consistently insisting that “giving to others and having oneself are simply not in competition with one another in a theological economy” (Economy of Grace, 83).   Indeed, for Tanner, if our giving to others is taken advantage of, if our ability to posses what is ours is imperiled by our sharing it, we have every right to exclusive possession of ourselves and our goods, and the right to protect them violently.  If other persons “don’t advantage you, they void their ownership of you, leaving you now in exclusive possession of yourself, with rights of self-protection against them.”  Indeed for Tanner it is axiomatic that all have the “exclusive right of self-protection against those who would harm you” (Economy of Grace, 82).

Thus, at the end of the day, despite protestations to the contrary, Tanner’s theological economics is simply a dressed up advocacy of philanthropy.  It is premised on the notion that what we have is to be given away only insofar as such giving does not diminish us.  We give to those in need out of our fullness, not in any way that costs us anything.  For her, the ultimate enemy is the thought of having to give something up.  Self-limitation, self-denial, self-sacrifice, these are councils of despair and evil in Tanner’s eyes.  For her “giving should not be at odds with one’s continuing to have.”  Rather we should all simply realize that we need to bring about a some sort of paradisical community ”in which each effort to perfect oneself enriches others’ efforts at self-perfection” (Economy of Grace, 84).

In contrast to Tanner’s insistence that we need never suffer or give anything up, Rowan Williams offers us a much different account of the implications of the triune life of gift-giving for the shape of our own lives.  Williams argues that, “If the substance of the gospel has to do with God’s giving up possession or control – in Paul’s language, the Father giving up or giving over the Son to the cross, or Christ giving up his ‘wealth’, security, life for the sake of human beings – then the speech appropriate to this must renounce certain kinds of claims and strategies.”  Williams argues, contrary to Tanner, that the shape of God’s self-giving in Christ places distinctly self-limiting and self-sacrificial demands on those who would follow Christ.  As Williams argues, “I can either attempt to close off my vulnerability or I can so work with it as to show the character of God.”  (Rowans Williams, On Christian Theology, 257-259).  Here Williams recognizes precisely what Tanner wishes to close her eyes to, namely that we live in essential vulnerability.  Her longings for a community of mutual fulfillment where we all get to have everything we want is precisely the desire to flee from the vulnerability of creaturehood. 

Tanner falls into the trap which Williams sees so clearly of assuming, “that we possess a territory to be safeguarded”.  Williams is absolutely right that, in contrast to Tanner, “the gospel of the resurrection proposes that ‘possesion’ is precisely the wrong, the corrupt and corrupting, metaphor for our finding our place in the world.  What we ‘possess’ must go; we must learn to be what we receive from God in the vulnerability of living in (not above) the world of change and chance” (On Christian Theology, 273-274).  It is precisely this world of change and chance which thrusts us into vulnerability and neediness that Tanner cannot stand, insisting instead on the right of self-protection and insulation from that world.

Likewise, Arthur McGill argues, in contrast to Tanner that philanthropy can never be the shape of the love manifested to us in Christ.  He argues that “Jesus does not identify love primarily with producing good in the lives of others.  Not does he equate it with what we call ‘philanthropy,’ that is, the giving of surplus wealth or surplus time to help others.  On the contrary a man only begins to love as Jesus commands when he gives out of what is essential to him, out of what he cannot ‘afford.’  For Jesus, it is the deliberate and uninhibited willingness to expend oneself for another that constitutes love” (Arthur McGill, Suffering: A Test of Theological Method, 55).  

This notion of love as self-expenditure is precisely what Tanner cannot countenance.  For her, our gift-giving must always be out of our abundant surplus, never out of what is essential to us.  And of course, Tanner will point out that such a notion of love as self-expenditure will lead to the mortification of the self.  If you completely and prodigally give yourself away, holding nothing back, then you will eventually get used up and die.  As McGill states directly, “Of course, if you live in this way, you will be used up by others.  Of course, they will take everything you have.  That is why you should expect this self-expenditure to lead sooner or later to your death” (Suffering, 55).

What is at work in the contrast between the philanthropy of Tanner on the one hand, and the self-expending vulnerability of Williams and McGill on the other is a profoundly different theological consrtual of what it means to be truly alive.  For Tanner, being alive means being in possession of one’s self, able to freely give to others without cost to oneself.  For Williams, being fully alive means casing oneself in the same mode of self-dispossessing kenotic love that is manifested in the cross of Christ.  “We are to offer our lives as a sacrifice to the Father, as Christ did, and to follow the pattern of self-emptying or non-grasping embodied in Christ” (On Christian Theology, 254).  Likewise, for McGill, “being dynamically alive does not consist heaping up treasures or achievements or reputations for oneself.  It consists in expending oneself for others.”  In contrast to Tanner, there is no ethic of self-perfection and self-possession appropriate to the Christian faith.  If we take Christ seriously, we must insist that it is self-expenditure for the sake of the other that is the very flourishing of our humanity.  “Self-expenditure is self-fulfillment.  He who loses his life is thereby finding it.  Loving is itself life, and not just a means to life.  He who expends himself for his neighbor, even to death truly lives.  But he who lives for himself and avoids death truly dies. ‘He who does not love remains in death.’” (Suffering, 57)

It is precisely this understanding, embodied by Williams and McGill that conforms to the gospel in all its foolishness.  While Tanner’s construal of non-sacrificial giving sounds utterly reasonable to modern ears, McGill’s call to complete and total self-expenditure sounds worthy of scorn.  And that is precisely how Williams’ and McGill’s accounts of the Christian life conform to the gospel in way that Tanner’s fundamentally does not.  They call us into the life of “having nothing, yet possessing everything” (2 Cor. 6:10) in which  we are called to precisely the sort of foolishness that would insist that the greatest love possible is to lay down one’s very life.  There is no way to make the call to self-expenditure palatable.  It is simply the shape of the gospel.  We can either fall up that rock and be broken or wait for it to fall on us and be crushed.  And we will indeed be blessed if we are not offended on account of the one who calls us into his life of self-dispossesion and kenosis.  For it is only in the complete surrender of our lives that we discover the fullness of life abundant.

Rowan Williams on Discipleship

Jesus has brought us together precisely so that we look at one another with that degree of expectancy, which (as again I usually have to say) doesn’t mean that you will agree with everything the other Christian says. It simply means that you begin by saying, ‘What is Jesus Christ giving me here and now?’ Never mind the politics; never mind the policy; never mind anything, just ask that question and it does perhaps move you forward a tiny bit in discipleship. Can we live in a Church characterized by expectancy towards one another of that kind? It would be a very biblical experience of the Church.

But now, awareness, expectancy, discipleship as not something intermittent – all of this presupposes the category of following, which is so very basic in all the language about discipleship. This listening awareness, this expectancy, presupposes following because it presupposes that we are willing to travel to where the master is, to follow where the master goes. And, of course, in the gospels, where the master goes is very frequently not where we would have thought of going, or where we would have wanted to go. Hence, taking up the instrument of our execution – the cross – and walking his way.

Rowan Williams, “Being Disciples”

Rowan Williams: Multiculturalism?!

“We live in probably the least multicultural human environment there has ever been. The global market has canonised once and for all certain ways of making: industrialisation is everywhere, the network of global communication is everywhere, the effects of market forces are felt by everyone on the face of the globe…. It may be benevolent to some aspects of local cultures; it may learn to speak in local accents for certain purposes, advertising or decoration but it works in one mode of roduction, employment and marketing, and assumes that everyone is a potential customer. It is as universal as ever Christianity or Islam aspired to be, but the substance of its universality is a set of human functions (producing, selling, consuming) rather than any sense of innate human capacity and of the unsettling mysteriousness that goes with that.”

HT: Douglas Knight

Rowan Williams on True Ethics

The crucial question that has to be asked in the Christian moral evaluation of act or character is, does it speak of the God whose nature is self-dispossession for the sake of the life of the other? of the commitment and dependability of the divine action towards the creation? of the divine relinquishment of ‘interest’ and claim as embodied in the life of Jesus? These are not, I think, issues that leave us with an individualized or uncritical ethic. They are matters capable of being raised in the context of sexual ethics as much as the ethics of business or international relations. And it may be that something like this is rather badly needed as the discourses of Christian ethics polarize increasingly between legalism based on the injunctions of the text and a vacuous experientialism, appealing to precisely the wrong sort of interiority for its criteria.

Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 263.

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