Category Archives: Anabaptist Theology

Two extremes

If you want to read something incredibly stupid, make sure to check out Mark Tooley’s dreck, “Mennonite Takeover.” This lovely piece of “writing” wonders if the malignant Neo-Anabaptists of today will someday repent of all the mean things they say about “traditional American Christianity,” you know, since mainline Christians have apologized profusely for killing all those Anabaptists back in the day it seems only fair. . .

On the other hand if you want to read something incredibly good, check out the second part of K.J. Swanson’s three-part article critiquing the politics of gender in evangelicalism and the Twilight series.

Anabaptists and Ecumenism

I mentioned earlier Rowan Williams’ charitable comments about the Anabaptist/Mennonite stream of the Christian faith, and the important contribution it bears for the rest of Christianity as a whole. While I appreciate Williams’ comment greatly, the occasion — not the comment itself — reminded me of what I think is a common problem in the way in which Anabaptism tends to be “appreciated” in certain ecumenical circles (like the Ekklesia Project, for example).

It goes something like this: Anabaptism is important and helpful because, out of all the streams of the Christian tradition, it is the one that can teach us about how important it is to be pacifists. Thus, we the way that the Anabaptist witness is appropriated is generally by Catholic or mainline Protestant Christians embracing pacifism while remaining unchanged in regard to other theological distinctives. A good example of this is the Mennonite-Catholic dialogue group, Bridgefolk, which describes itself as “a movement of sacramentally-minded Mennonites and peace-minded Roman Catholics who come together to celebrate each other’s traditions, explore each other’s practices, and honor each other’s contribution to the mission of Christ’s Church.”

Note the way this is set up: Mennonites have got peace and Catholics have got sacramentalism. Let’s slap the two together for extra ecumenical awesomeness! The Bridgefolk self-description goes on: “Together we seek better ways to embody a commitment to both traditions. We seek to make Anabaptist-Mennonite practices of discipleship, peaceableness, and lay participation more accessible to Roman Catholics, and to bring the spiritual, liturgical, and sacramental practices of the Catholic tradition to Anabaptists.” Again the mode of ecumenism at work here is clear: Mennonites have some good stuff to say about “discipleship” and “peaceableness” while Catholicism has got it figured out when it comes to “spiritual, liturgical, and sacramental practices.” All we need to do is appropriate these lovely elements and, viola! we have the perfect new instantiation of the Christian faith!

Now, to be sure I appreciate the way in which the contributions of the Anabaptist tradition to nonviolence and peacemaking are being appreciated by other elements of Christianity. I am truly thankful for this and I’m sure a lot of good comes out of groups like Bridgefolk. However, I think this sort of “reception” of Anabaptism is often a way of not actually taking Anabaptism seriously. The Anabaptist tradition is not, first of all, about “nonviolence” but rather about the nature of discipleship, the church, the world and the meaning of Christ’s Lordship. You can’t divorce Anabaptist’s theology of peace from their commitment to things like believer’s baptism, voluntary church membership, congregationalism, the rejection of clericalism, and yes, opposition to certain understandings of sacramentalism. To do so is to fail to take the tradition with any real seriousness. The same is true for Anabaptists and Mennonites who quickly latch on to quasi-Catholic enthusiasm about sacramental theology. (Indeed, most of what I’m saying here applies, vice-versa, to free churchers who think they can appropriate whatever elements of Catholicism they find compelling, a similarly-common tendency.)

The only point I really want to make here is that the assumption of some sort of easy give-and-take between the free churches and the establishment churches (Catholic or Protestant) is profoundly misguided. The Anabaptist tradition isn’t just “there” to provide mainline churches with a handy theological pacifism any more than the magisterial traditions are there to give free churches a nice way to think sacramentally. The divisions are much deeper, much more real, and indeed must more theological than such sorts of ecclectic ecumenism of convenience tends to acknowledge.

Powers and Practices §2: Philip Stolzfus

The second chapter of Powers and Practices is a far cry, in terms of quality, from the first, and hopefully all the following essays. It is entitled “Nonviolent Jesus, Nonviolent God?” and it attempts to critique Yoder for allegedly not going far enough in purging his “concept of God” of violent images, such as those contained in the Exodus narrative.

In the last few pages of the chapter the author makes clear what’s really at work in his critique of Yoder. Stolzfus is really just advocating for a certain sort of well-worn of Mennonite theology that parrots Gordon Kaufman and Sallie MacFauge  by simply discounting all elements of the Bible’s depiction of God that are deemed insufficiently nonviolent. For Stolzfus this means that, in contrast to Yoder who reneged on the task, we need to get down to the real business of “theological construction” (p. 40), that is by articulating a properly systematized and pristinely nonviolent conceptuality of God.

Stolzfus’s chapter amounts to little more than a fit of whining about the fact that Yoder didn’t do theology that way. It also makes clear how deeply Stolzfus really doesn’t understand the nature of Yoder’s project. Ironically, Stolzfus, in his rabbid concern to purge all “violent” conceptions of God from theology in advance, winds up advocating some mode of theological thinking that is, from the outset, totalizing and violent in itself. Stoltzfus has no patience for Yoder’s “dialogical stance” (p. 38)  because it fails to secure, in advance, the concept of God that Stolzfus, as a liberal Mennonite is willing to accept.

But this is precisely where Yoder is, in fact the true “pacifist” while Stolzfus by contrast is utterly, well, violent. He cannot take the risk of letting the reality of God come to him from somewhere other than his own predetermined image thereof. God must be only and always this. Therefore any thought along these lines is excluded. The sort of “nonviolence” that Stolzfus wants to hardwire in advance into our conception of God is hardly the peace of Jesus. It requires the presence of “violent” images of God, against which it must be counterposed to have any purchase. The “nonviolent” God that Stolzfus argues for is defined, agonistically, by what it is against. This “nonviolent” God requires violence and is systematically rendered within a binary (violent) mode of theological reflection that is at once simplistic and lackadaisical.

This is not to say that the images of divine violence in the Bible are not real problems. They are. But it is Stolzfus who fails to deal with the problem, not Yoder. Yoder, in keeping with his commitment to vulnerable engagement with the biblical witness, takes time and patience to actually struggle with the text, rather than deciding in advance what simply must be stripped away because of his own predetermined theological sensibilities.

I’m all for reading solid critiques of Yoder, but a lazy half-baked Marcionism like the kind offered here doesn’t impress me at all. I hope the next chapter is better than this.

On the Martyrdom of Michael Sattler

Brad posts the reasons given by the authorities for the torture and murder of Michael Sattler, one of the key figures in sixteenth century Anabaptism:

“First, that he and his adherents have acted contrary to the mandate of the Emperor.

“Secondly, he has taught, held and believed that the body and blood of Christ are not present in the sacrament.

“Thirdly, he has taught and believed that infant baptism does not conduce to salvation.

“Fourthly, they have rejected the sacrament of extreme unction.

“Fifthly, they have despised and condemned the mother of God and the saints.

“Sixthly, he has declared that men are not to swear before the authorities.

“Seventhly, he has commenced a new and unheard of custom in regard to the Lord’s Supper, placing the bread and wine on a plate, and eating and drinking the same.

“Eighthly, he has left the order, and married a wife.

“Ninthly, he has said that if the [Muslims] should invade the country, no resistance ought to be offered them; and if it were right to wage war, he would rather take the field against the Christians than against the [Muslims]; and it is certainly a great matter, to set the greatest enemies of our holy faith against us.”

—Thieleman J. van Braght, The Bloody Theater or Martyrs Mirror of the Defenseless Christians (translated by Joseph F. Sohm; Scottdale: Mennonite Publishing House, 1951), p. 416

Many of these charges are completely baseless the others are twisted half-truths at best . . . save one. It is true that Sattler and his followers acted contrary to the mandates of the Emperor when it contradicted the commands of Jesus.

Is Conversion an Act of the Will?

To continue with the theme of voluntarism, let us examine a claim often made against advocates of believers’ baptism. It is generally argued that to require the subject of baptism to be professing believers is to make the grace of God contingent upon an act of the human will (voluntas). That is, by insisting that the baptized be believers, the church places human volition above God’s divine initiative. The act of the will to believe in Christ is prior to and more determinative than God’s baptismal grace. So the argument goes as I understand it. I trust my interlocutors will correct me if I have stated this in an unbalanced way.

The problem with this argument lies in its hidden premise, namely that believing and wanting to follow Jesus as some sort of self-asserting act of willpower. Biblically and theologically this is simply wrong. No one comes to Christ unless drawn by the Father (John 6:44; 65). To respond to Christ’s call to discipleship is not the act of human self-assertion, but rather of submission to God’s own initiative which has taken hold the person called. Following Christ is not an act of heroic effort that we chose, rather it is something that we cannot do other than choose on the basis of God’s action towards us in Christ: “Lord, to whom can we go? You have the words of eternal life” (John 6:68).

As such, believers’ baptism does not rest on any sort of enshrining of human voluntas. Conversion to Christ, commitment to discipleship—none of this is a heroic act of the will. Rather it is simply the response of evoked love that is manifest whenever the Father draws people to the Son through the Spirit. An advocacy of believers’ baptism simply reflects a commitment to respond to God’s action in human beings with a Yes. Baptism is merely our agreement with what God has done, our recognition of the truth of how God has drawn a person into the Triune life.

More on the Voluntariness of the Church

According the free church tradition, only those who believe in Christ as Lord should be baptized into the church as members of his body. As such, for this tradition membership in the body of Christ is voluntary. It is not imposed, but rather is given to those who come to baptism out of a desire to follow Christ.

The majority tradition of the Christian faith labels this an unacceptable form of modern voluntarism, claiming that it places the priority on the self-determining autonomy of the human subject rather on the free grace of God. Now, clearly a whole discussion could be had about the nature of grace and how it draws human beings toward the church. Let us leave that aside for the moment.

If we cut through the fog generated by the scare word of “voluntarism,” it seems to me that there are only two possible construes of how baptism ought to go down. If the voluntary baptism of believers is illicit as the normative practice, what is the alternative? The only alternative to voluntary baptism is involuntary baptism, is it not?

Now, everyone agrees that voluntary baptism is acceptable and right. No on is opposed to converts being baptized upon profession of faith. The question, as I see it, must rest on what theological reasons  we have for baptizing those who do not believe in Christ and do not have the ability to consent or dissent from baptism? What theological reasons are there for involuntary baptism? That seems to me to be a reasonable question. I have yet to see, theologically, why involuntary baptism should be the norm of the church’s practice.

The Voluntary Church

John Howard Yoder often gets critiqued (the work of Oliver O’Donovan is a good example) for his alleged “voluntarism.” Yoder, being an Anabaptist is, of course, opposed to infant baptism and insists that membership in the church must always be a voluntary, free, and uncoerced reality. Thus, the baptism of children is suspect for Yoder as it is an act totally void of active participation on the part of the baptized.

Now, whatever we might think of this I just want to make one point. Yoder is not guilty of voluntarism in any sort of modern sense. Yoder and Anabaptism as a whole does not emphasize the voluntary nature of the church for the sake of enshrining the freedom of the individual to be self-determining. Indeed, this is impossible on the basis of the Anabaptist vision of ecclesial discipleship which always involves strong communal commitments and mutual submission.

The only point Yoder makes in emphasizing the voluntary nature of the church is that membership in the body of Christ cannot be coercively imposed. That is all. The church is voluntary in Anabaptist theology, not because the modern self requires it, but because unilateral coercion cannot be used to make disciples. The one and only point of speaking of the church as a voluntary community is to say that no one is either forced into it or born into it. Rather persons are drawn into it through Christ’s to discipleship.

Against “Christian” Education of Youth

Yoder has some pretty harsh (and quite Anabaptist) comments about the notion of churches attempting to deploy “education of the young people” as a sociological tool to preserve the church from the acids of the world. He attacks pretty furiously the notion that we have to work to “keep the young people.” He couches this in a critique of his own Anabaptist tradition, but partly does so by claiming that this youth-protectionist sort of mentality is really the product of the (Constantinian) state-church traditions:

“If we turn from this general introduction to the question of church-guided education of young people, we observe first of all that the movement toward church primary and secondary schools in the United States has been led by those churches that belong to the medieval state-church tradition. The Roman Catholics, the conservative Calvinists, and the conservative Lutherans lead the movement. These are precisely those churches that are by nature committed to a non-missionary view of the church. They baptize their babies, and seek by rigid catechization and strict moral teaching to maintain proper standards of behavior and doctrine. The parochial school is for them an effort to retain, in free America, the cultural monopoly that they had each in its own corner of Europe, in order to survive by use of deterministic forces. There is no reason to hold this against them, for it corresponds to their definition of faith as being primarily doctrinal. For them it is consistent, for they never did accept the biblical and Anabaptist claim that the visible church lives only by evangelization.”

A bit harsh perhaps, but coming from a background of being highly socialized into Christianity, and knowing full well the kind of irrational protectionist mentality that persists in the church about the young people “falling away” if they are allowed to actually experience the world, I think there’s a good point in here somewhere.

If we think the church can only be sustained through concerted social and psychological manipulation of our children, then the church isn’t worth preserving. After all, if we don’t really believe that the church lives by the power of the gospel to call people out of the world, we’ve lost the gospel altogether. Yoder delivers another zinger on this point:

“[Much of the church] fears that if the young person, especially in adolescence, is permitted to become acquainted with the world and its lures, he is sure to be lost. This prediction is, in all its intended realism, a lack of faith and a surrender to determinism. If the Gospel cannot call people out of the world, it is no Gospel. If what we preach to our young people cannot call them out of the world, then we must ask ourselves if what we are preaching is the Gospel. If placing people in a context of choice where it is possible to choose the wrong is unwise, then God himself made the first mistake when he created Adam and the worst mistake when he let people kill his Son. At the bottom of it all, this pessimism means placing oneself fully on the level of the world. It means agreeing with the world that all human development is determined by physical and psychological necessities; agreeing with the world that Christian faith is a matter of behavior patterns and of truths to be passed on; agreeing with the world that there is no miracle of resurrection, no miracle of faith, no Holy Spirit.”

Regardless of if one is persuaded by Yoder’s skewering of paedo-baptism, his blow against the protectionist mentality in the church is a solid one that needs to be heeded.

(Quotes are from John Howard Yoder, “Christian Education: Doctrinal Orientation,” in Concern for Education, Forthcoming from Cascade Books.)

Does the Church Precede the World?

John Howard Yoder famously makes the claim that the “church precedes the world” in at least two key senses:

“The church precedes the world epistemologically. We know more fully from Jesus Christ and in the context of the confessed faith than we know in other ways. The meaning and validity and limits of concepts like ‘nature’ or of ‘science’ are best seen not when looked at alone, but in light of the confession of the lordship of Christ. The church precedes the world as well axiologically, in that the lordship of Christ is the center which must guide critical value choices, so hat we may be called to subordinate or even to reject those values which contradict Jesus.” (The Priestly Kingdom, p. 11)

A bold and revolutionary claim to be sure. However, what does it truly mean for the church to precede the world in this sense? Or is this even conceptually possible?

Yoder on Protestant Identity

“All that is sure about ‘Protestant’ identity is that it is not Roman Catholic: it does not have a pope or magisterium with theologically imperative, morally binding authority, nor a structure of confession and absolution wherewith to educate and enforce. Yet that negation is not made on behalf of a counter-patriarch or an anti-magisterium, but rather by virtue of a critical principle of appeal to the sources, which can reach unpredictably farther than those who first called themselves ‘Protestant’ dreamed.”

– John Howard Yoder, The Royal Priesthood (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2984), 17.

Benedictine Community and Anabaptist Ecclesiology

Anabaptism is unique among all ecclesial frames for reference derived from the Reformation in many ways, one of which involves its Catholic roots and specifically Benedictine roots. Unlike Luther the Augustinian, Calvin the lawyer, or Zwingli the Christian humanist, the Anabaptist tradition arose largely in the soil of the Benedictine tradition. This is seen most clearly in the influence of Michael Sattler over the Radical Reformation. The earliest Anabaptist confession, The Schletheim Confession, is widely accepted as deriving directly from the thought of Sattler, and its fundamental affirmations are clearly Benedictine in origination.

Herein lies the fundamental difference between Anabaptism the other major offspring of the Reformation, especially Lutheranism. Luther’s theology was shaped in a thoroughgoing manner by his rejection of human action and ecclesial practices as coterminous with divine action and merit. As such Luther vehemently rejected monastic profession and the Christian taking of vows. Anabaptism, by contrast never rejected the more “catholic” emphases in ecclesiology, even including the church’s ability to participate in divine action through the power of the keys in pronouncing absolution. Likewise Anabaptism did not reject the monastic (and particularly Benedictine) notion of intentional community, vows, and embodied life together.

The key point of disctinction between the Radical Reformation and its Benedictine roots came in regard to the issue of ecclesiology. For Sattler and the Anabaptist tradition as a whole, the monastic practices that originate in the Benedictine tradition are not intended simply for a monastic class within the church, but rather for all members of the church without exception. For the Anabaptists there is no salvation outside of the perfection of Christ. The “counsels of perfection” are not for a monastic caste, but rather for all believers. This is the center of the Anabaptist theology of discipleship, not a rejection of monastic practices and a catholic vision of the importance of the church as a locus of divine action, but a univeralizing and intentional ecclesializing of the monastic vision.

The Purple Crown: A Review

The Purple Crown: The Politics of Martyrdom is the second book in Herald Press’s excellent new series, “Polyglossia: Radical Reformation Theologies.” Chris Huebner’s book, A Precarious Peace opened up the series with a book of supreme quality, erudition, and sophistication. Tripp York’s The Purple Crown proves to be a solid addition to the series and a helpful study on the nature of Christian martyrdom. He opens the book with a discussion of the early church’s experience and theology of martyrdom, especially emphasizing the connection between martyrdom and baptism, as well as the relationship between martyrdom and liturgy. For the early Christians, martyrdom was, in fact a public liturgy in which the powers of the kingdom of God entered into contest with the powers of Satan. 

The second chapter puts forth a theology of the body in light of martyrdom. York argues that martyrdom is impossible unless the Christian body has been duly trained for it through the discipline of ecclesial-liturgical askesis. Christian liturgy is a form of bodily training for martyrdom; without such training the body will not be able to endure the heavenly contest between God and the Devil that takes place in the site of the martyr’s body. The material reality of the body is crucially important to York’s account here. Because the body is the mode through which humanity enters into communion with the divine (chiefly through the Eucharist), the body is of the utmost soteriological importance. The body is the site of salvation itself. This is why Christians cannot offer up their bodies (or the bodies of others) for anything other than God’s own kingdom. The body, being  the site of salvation, cannot be given over to any ideology or community that is not salvific.

The third chapter is one of the most interesting ones in the book, as it deals with perhaps the most crucial question for a Christian theology of martyrdom, namely that of Christians who are named as martyrs who were killed by other Christians. Here the issue of the sixteenth-century conflict between Catholics, Protestants, and Anabaptists is particularly important. On both sides of the Catholic-Protestant divide there was mutual killing which both sides narrated differently. Those of their own who were killed were holy martyrs, while those who they themselves killed were criminals being duly punished by law. The Anabaptists occupy a somewhat different place in this narrative as they alone were solely on the receiving end of violence in the sixteenth century. As such, they developed a very strong theology of martyrdom as delineated in the tome Martyr’s Mirror

York explores these debacles and attempts to hold them open rather than find a way to neatly close them. The question of how to make sense of a Christianity that persecutes itself cannot be easily closed, especially in view of the fact that the self-descriptions of the bodies involved in this historical debacle all invariably identified those against them as the antichrist, rather than as fellow-Christians. In the end, York shows his preference for the Anabaptists, a point that clearly has a strong case to be made for it. However, he also notes that, in addition to embodying a witness of nonviolence in the face of extreme persecution, the Anabaptist tradition includes within it an impetus towards a hermeneutic of martyrdom that is capable of recognizing the martyrs outside of one’s own camp. This is seen in the fact that, within Martyr’s Mirror there are included many stories, including at least one of the martyrdom of a Lutheran pastor. In the end, York struggles to leave the whole question of how to interpret the sixteenth-century debacle open, but one wonders if, by leaving it endlessly open, he has not in fact found a way of taming the problem itself. Sometimes telling us to “live in the tension” is itself a way of dissolving the tension.

The fourth chapter of the book is a foray into the work of William Cavanaugh, John Howard Yoder, and Augustine on the issue of the relationship between the heavenly and the earthly city. Herein York give a cogent account of the sort of theopolitical vision that has become commonly identified with the work of Stanley Hauerwas and John Howard Yoder. The church is public and political by virtue of its own reality as a community constituted by baptism and the Eucharist. It is in the church’s worship, rather than its attempts to “get involved” in the world that the church embodies its particular politics.

The fifth chapter is something of a biographical summary of the life and martyrdom of Oscar Romero. The book closes with an epilogue on the non-sacrificial economy of gift that is embodied in the witness of the martyrs. Keying off the work of David Bentley Hart, York argues that the martyrs embody a different order of vision, a different optics in which the Eucharistic mystery is lived out in conflict with the powers, showing forth to the world the luminescence of the divine economy of grace.

On the whole, York’s book is a solid and helpful account of martyrdom. The book does not quite live up to Huebner’s book which preceded it, but it should not be slighted for that reason. If anything, what could have helped York’s book more would have been more attention to connection. One of his best chapters is the fourth one, in which he helpfully lays out an Augustinian-Yoderian mode of theopolitics. However, this whole chapter offers hardly any mention of martyrdom at all, or the connection between this theopolitical vision and a proper theology of martyrdom.

Another key point that should be considered is whether or not York makes too much of the connection between the Eucharist and martyrdom. He claims that “the importance of the Eucharist for a faithful account of martyrdom cannot be overstated” (p. 152). I think, however that indeed it can be overstated, and York has perhaps overstated the importance thereof. Surely the Eucharist is central in forming a martyrological imagination, but it does so as a part of the whole sacramental and communal universe of the journey of discipleship. Eucharist alone cannot make martyrdom possible; the amount of Eucharist that was happening in Nazi Germany belies such a simplistic answer to such questions. Certainly York does not intend any such simplistic answer, but it is important to be cautious against “Eucharist” simply becoming a cipher that answers every theological question, as it, and so many other concepts and practices are wont to do.

Ultimately, York’s book offers a helpful addition to the Polyglossia series, and is a very cogent articulation of the theopolitics of martyrdom. It is to be commended to anyone interested in martyrdom and its implications for discipleship and ecclesiology.

Martyrological Epistemology

In his superb book, A Precarious Peace, Chris Huebner explores the connection between epistemology and martyrdom:

“Martyrdom names and approach to knowledge and a way of life more generally which assumes that the truth of Christ cannot somehow be secured, but is rather a gift received and lived out in vulnerable yet hopeful giving in return. On such a reading, the martyr is not one who dies for or because of her beliefs. Rather, the death of the martyr is in some meaningful way the very expression of belief itself. Martyrdom does not arise out of a feeling of control over death. Rather, it is but an expression of a way of life that gives up the assumption of being in control.” (p. 137)

This opens up a crucial vista on the nature of truth, the gospel, and the promise of peace through Christ. The martyr does not give “evidence” for the truth of Christian belief so much as embody a particular way of knowing that refuses to understand truth as a possession. The reality given to us in the gospel, the peace of Christ, is not something that is settled, stable, or under our control, or even ever able to be totally assimilated by us.

“Peace is itself and agonistic reality. It does not name a settled territory that we can fully embody or own. It is not something we own as a first instance called knowledge, which then informs our actions. Rather, it is a gift that might be given through us only when we no longer seek violently to control it.” (p. 142)

Thus, a martyrological epistemology, a mode of knowing and bearing witness to the truth of the gospel as given to us in Christ will take the form of constantly laying ourselves open before the ever-new Word of God which speaks Christ unexpected peace to us in the form of gratuitous and unprecedented gift. Thus the Christian way of knowing, in step with the martyrs, must eschew attempts at offering a total perspective, a closed circle, an indubitably justified belief:

“The knowledge of the martyrs is not preoccupied with epistemic justification but is shaped by the epistemological virtues of patience and hope. It is an agonistic mode of knowledge that proceeds in fragments and ad hoc alliances, not the development of large-scale totalities. This knowledge resists closure, refusing the lie of the total perspective and the search for a purified idiom of speech, recognizing that language about God is finally not limited to our current vocabularies.” (p. 143)

The epistemology of the martyrs is constituted by the refusal to totalize our way of knowing the truth, but rather to live in a constant state of kenotic openness to the gift of God’s truth in Jesus Christ. And only by embracing such a martyrological way of knowing can we be grasped by the truth, stand for the truth, and be found in the truth without reducing that truth to our own possession which we are driven to violently defend

Radical Reformation Historiography

One of the contributions of John Howard Yoder to Anabaptist ecclesiology and ecumenism is the way in which he articulates clearly the sort of historical method that underlies a Radical Reformation orientation. This is precisely the historical method that Yoder puts to work in his book, The Jewish-Christian Schism Revisited. He claims that “There is no error more natural, and perhaps there are few errors more damaging in the reading of history, than the assumption that events had to go the way they did.” His point is that what seems to us to be an inevitable historical development that we simply take as a given –the Jewish-Christian schism– was not always a given and importing its givenness into a time prior to its occurrence is to do historiographical violence.  There was a time when, to the Christian imagination, the separation between the church and the synagogue ”did not have to be.” The fact that it did turn out thusly does not imbue the outcome with normativity.

This is the crux of the sort of Radical Reformation historiography that informs Yoder’s work. For Yoder, the history of God’s people is not simply providentially guaranteed to turn out in a manner that is inevitably faithful or good. Rather, the church is radically defectible.  Radical unfaithfulness is a real possibility; the church is not merely guranteed to move in slowly in the right direction for all time.  It may find itself radically off course. 

For Yoder it is axiomatic that the church is always unfinished, striving towards, sometimes limping towards, and sometimes running away from its eschatological destiny. As such, the church cannot assume, when considering the outcomes of its history, that all has gone according to God’s intentions. Rather, the task of the church is to constantly reach back into the word that evoked the first generation of disciples. “What we find at the origin is already a process of reaching back again to the origins, to the earliest memories of the event itself, confident that that testimony, however intimately integrated with the belief of the witnesses, is not a wax nose, and will serve to illuminate and sometimes adjudicate our present path.”

The church must always be open to radical reformation, the the thoroughgoing reevaluation of what have come to be its historical givens and assumptions on the basis of the apostolic witnesses to Jesus. To do this, of course, is not to be guaranteed a safe and secure theological method.  Rather it is to thrust oneself into the agony of striving after the Truth that lies beyond us in the risen and ascended Christ, trusting that he will not leave us like orphans, but will come to us, even in our radical deformation as his broken, scattered body.

States of Exile: Great New Stuff From Herald Press

Herald Press continues to grace me with a steady supply of their new and excellent books.  The most recent one is the third volume in the incredibly good Polyglossia: Radical Reformation Theologies series.  States of Exile: Visions of Diaspora, Witness, and Return by Alain Epp Weaver is a potent analysis of the nature of exile, both in the Bible and the contemporary world, and its theological implications.  One of the things that Epp Weaver shows very well is that diaspora and return should not be held in binary opposition to each other.  Rather there are ways of being “at home” in exile and ways of retaining and “out of control” consciousness when living in the stability of place.

The book is anchored in Epp Weaver’s experience of spending more than a decade living among the disenfranchised Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip.  The reality of Israeli-Palestinian relations serves as a potent example of the reality of exile in our world.  However, Epp Weaver’s concerns are not simply to provide pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli polemics.  Rather, his discussion of the exilic state of the Palestinians is couched in the broader context of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity, and the implications of the shape of all three religions for how we understand exile, both theologically and politically. 

Following Yoder’s account of the “Jewish-Christian schism”, Epp Weaver offers some great critiques of contemporary theological ways of narrating the relationship between Jews and Christians.  Theologies in which the church replaces Israel and theologies where Israel and the church represent different communities on parallel paths to God are both equally problematic in that they both represent a distinctly non-exilic theological mode.  In other words, Christian theologies of Israel that either supersede Judaism or grant it autonomous validity both alike are attempts to maintain control of the theological encounter between Judaism and Christianity, thereby eliminating the possibility of experiencing “disruptive difference” between the two traditions whereby Jews, as Jews may teach Christians how to be Christians in new and vital ways.

A full review will be forthcoming, but I wanted to make sure to recommend the book as soon as possible.  This book embodies the best form of theological politics, being intimately atuned both to the empirical realities of our world of exile, and the interruptive narrative of Scripture which offers possibilities for new life in “seeking the peace of the city.”  For communities seeking to recover a theologically appropriate exilic vision this book will doubtless be quite challenging and helpful.

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